BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
CIVIL SUIT NO. 23A OF 2001
Mr. J. Carrington for Petitioner
Mrs. T. Davis for Respondent
2002:October 24 and 31.
 MATTHEW J. (Ag.).: After the hearing pertaining to the distribution of
property between the Parties, the Court made an Order on August 2, 2002
and the Registrar of the High Court on October 11, 2002 entered the said
Order as follows:
“IT IS ORDERED THAT the marital assets of the parties comprising:
(a) The value of the Morgan Stanley account number 379-033846 as at 2 August
(b) The value of the IRA account number 379-031269 held at Morgan Stanley as
at 2 August 2002;
(c) Condominium in Steamboat Springs valued at $70,000;
(d) Investments in United Bank and CDP1 valued at $105,000.00;
(e) Boat named Rendezvous Cay valued at $5000,000.00 and
(f) Real Estate in Florida valued at $90,000.00 to be apportioned between the
parties with 70 per cent being awarded to the Petitioner and 30 per cent to the
 By summons filed on September 28, 2002 the Petitioner applied for clarification
of the following aspects of the order made on August, 2002 namely –
(i) that all the marital assets that are to be valued as at August 2, 2002 and
that the Respondent is to receive 30 per cent of such value
(ii) the Respondent’s obligation to transfer her share in PRI Inc. to the
Applicant’s nominee upon the Applicant’s compliance with the order;
(iii) the treatment of the monies advanced by the Applicant to the Respondent
after the break down of the marriage in April, 2001;
(iv) the treatment of the debts incurred by the Applicant as a result of the
Respondent’s freezing of the trust account in the Florida Courts;
(v) the treatment of the account which the Respondent realized during the
course of the proceedings.
 The authority for the application was quite rightly based on Halsbury’s Laws of
England, Fourth Edition, Volume 26, paragraphs 556 and 557. Part of paragraph
556 which deals with amendment after entry of judgment or order reads: “The
Court has inherent jurisdiction to vary or clarify an order so as to carry out the
Court’s meaning or make the language plain, or to amend it where a party has
been wrongly named or described unless this would change the subsistence of
 Paragraph 557 deals with amendment of clerical or accidental mistakes. It reads
in part: “After the judgment or order has been entered there is power, both under
the rules of Court and inherent in the judge or master who gave or made the
judgment or order, to correct any clerical mistake in it or some error arising in it
from any accidental slip or omission or to vary the judgment or order so as to give
effect to his meaning and intention.”
 Rule 42.10 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2000 also provides for correction of
errors in judgments or orders. It reads –
(1) The Court may at any time (without an appeal) correct a clerical
mistake in a judgment or order from any accidental slip or omission.
(2) A party may apply for a correction without notice.”
 The rule is pertinent to paragraph (ii) if the Petitioner’s summons. PR1 Inc. is
the company that owns the boat referred to in paragraph (e) of the Order.
There are two shares in the Company and the Parties own one share each.
The boat is the only asset of the Company. The effect of the Courts’ order is
that the Petitioner should receive 70 per cent of the value of the boat and the
Respondent to receive 30 per cent. It would inevitably follow that the
Respondnet would be obliged to transfer her one share in PR1 Inc. to the
 This matter need not have reached the Court as learned Counsel for the
Respondent had recognized that obligation of her client. This can clearly be
dealt with under the ship rule and for the avoidance of doubt I order the
Respondent to transfer her share in PR1 Inc. to the Petitioner or his nominee
upon the Petitioner’s compliance with the order .
 Learned Counsel for the Petitioner quite rightly recognized that the matters
falling under paragraphs (iii), (iv) and (v) of his summons do not fall within the
jurisdiction of the Court. Indeed these were matters which were argued at the
hearing and were subsumed in the judgment and taken into consideration in
arriving at the final distribution of the 70:30 ratio.
 So the only matter left to be dealt with in the Petitioner’s summons is the one
at paragraph (1). In making his submissions under that head learned
Counsel for the Petitioner said that his understanding was that the marital
assets were to be valued as at the date of ruling but the properties at (c) to (f)
were not valued as at August 2. Counsel referred in this context to paragraph
62 of the Courts’ judgment made on August 2, 2002. Counsel later referred
to paragraphs 63-66 of the judgment.
 Learned Counsel for the Respondent referred to paragraphs 60 and 62 of the
judgment in particular and submitted that there was nothing to clarify in the
order. She said paragraph (ii) was not an issue and the last three paragraphs
were withdrawn. I agree with that submission.
 As stated in the judgment the bulk of the marital assets were those in the
Morgan Stanley Accounts, that is those at paragraphs (a) and (b) of the
Courts’ Order. Their value as at the date of the judgment was about
$2,656,217.68 compared to the assets at (c) to (f) which were found as a fact
to value approximately $765,000.
 The properties at (a) and (b) did form the bulk of the assets. The other assets
could only be found to be such at the date of the judgment which was August
2, 2002. So in effect that was the date of their valuation.
 The reason why a date was specifically put on (a) and (b) is because as the
judgment says at paragraph 62, the Court was told and the Court believed
that market fluctuations would affect the bulk of the assets, that is (a) and (b),
and the Courts’ thinking at the time was if a clear break had to be made and
the Respondent had to be paid off, a date had to be fixed for the valuation.
 I do not think there was any merit in the summons. It is therefore dismissed
with costs to the Respondent in the amount of $600.00
High Court Judge Ag.