Julian Wade v The Governor of Montserrat et al
IN THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN SUPREME COURT
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
COLONY OF MONTSERRAT
CLAIM NO. MNIHCV2010/0001
THE GOVERNOR OF MONTSERRART
HON. ATTORNEY GENERAL
Mr. David Brandt for the Claimant
Mr. Fitzroy Buffong for the Defendants
2013: September 26
2013: November 05
NOV 0 5 2013
[I] REDHEAD J. (ag): The Claimant filed a Notice of Motion for Judicial
Review on the 10lh of January 2010 in which he prayed for the following
(i) An order quashing the decision of the First Defendant to rescind the
Claimant’s appointment as an Inspector of Police.
(ii)An order that the defendant breached the Rules of Natural Justice when he
failed to afford the Claimant an opportunity to be heard before deciding to
(iii)An order that the first defendant, His Excellency the Governor, of
Montserrat, is by law required to decide the application made on or about the
28th of February 2008 by the Claimant for the post of Inspector of Police in
the Royal Montserrat Force properly according to law and particularly in
accordance with the principles of parity, comparability, quality and
transparency required by fairness generally and regulations #20 of the Police
Service Regulations of Montserrat.
(iv)An order that the first Defendant took into account irrelevant
considerations in making the decision to rescind the apprJ al of the
(v) An order that the first Defendant failed to ascertain relevant information
and in particular that the Claimant was severely reprimandld by the
Commissioner of Police, information which formed the basis f~r the First
Defendant’s decision for rescinding the Claimant’s appointment.
(vi) A declaration that the First Defendant’s decision to rescind the
Claimant’s appointment was unreasonable.
(vii) A mandatory order requiring the First Defendant or either of them to
appoint the Claimant to the post of Inspector of Police in the Royal
Montserrat Police Force retroactive from the date he would have been
appointed, in accordance with his legitimate expectations.
(viii) A declaration that the Claimant had a legitimate expectation to be
appointed as an Inspector having regard to the Public Service Commission
Regulations and the settled practice.
(ix) Such orders or directions as may be necessary or appropriate to secure
redress by the Claimant for contravention by the Defendants either of them of
the rules of Natural Justice.
 The Claimant was enlisted as a Police Constable in the Royal Montserrat
Police Force in April 1990. In December 2006 the Claimant was promoted to
the rank of Acting Sergeant. On or about the month of March 2008, the
Claimant made an application for the post of Inspector of Police. The
Claimant was interviewed for the post.
 The Claimant says that this was done under the watchful eyes of the Office of
the Department of Administration! Government Headquarters.
 At the time of his application for the post of Inspector of Police the Claimant
had completed a Bachelor of Laws degree (LL.B) at WolverHampton
 In or about May 2008 the Claimant wrote to the Commissioner of Police
requesting one year study leave to complete the Bar vocational course at the
College of Law Birmingham.
 On the 5th of August, the Claimant not having had a reply to his letter of May
2008, wrote again to the Commissioner of Police reminding him of his letter
and advising the Commissioner that he needed to be in the United Kingdom
by 22nd August 2008 for orientation at the College.
 On the 22nd of August, 2008 the Claimant received a response from the
Commissioner of Police advising the Claimant that the Royal Montserrat
Police Force was conducting an investigation into a report made by Alwyn
Ponteen and also a report in which he had discharged a firearm. As a result of
the investigation he was not allowed to travel to the U.K until the completion
of the investigations.
 As a result, the Claimant consulted his attorney, Mr. David Brandt who wrote
to the Commissioner requesting a meeting with him to discuss “the best way
forward” for the Claimant to be released to attend law school.
 The Claimant, not having heard from the Commissioner of Police sought the
interventions of the then Acting Chief Minister and later the Chief Minister.
These interventions did not yield any positive results.
 As a result , the Claimant swore, that in desperation he sought a meeting
with the Commissioner of Police. This was unsuccessful.
[II] The following day the Claimant met with the Commissioner who told the
Claimant that he was awaiting the reports of the investigations and he could
not do anything.
 On the 20lh August the Commissioner of Police informed the Claimant
that the shooting incident was found to be justifiable but he, the
Commissioner of Police, had to pay monetary compensation to Alwyn
Ponteen (the other matter investigated).
 The Commissioner of Police informed the Claimant that should this
reoccur in the future disciplinary action would be instituted against him and a
formal reprimand would follow.
 Permission was then granted to the Claimant to travel to the U.K to attend
law schoo!. The Claimant left Montserrat on 22 August 2008 for the U.K.
 On the 15th of January 20 I 0 the Commissioner of Police wrote to the
Claimant that he the Claimant was reverting back to his substantive rank of
Constable as from the 22nd August 2008. Sometime in June/July 2009 the
Claimant wrote to the office of His Excellency, the Governor requesting the
result of the interview for the post of Inspector of Police. The Claimant did
not receive a reply.
 On the 4th of May 2009, the Claimant again wrote to His Excellency, the
Governor reminding him that he did not receive a reply to the previous letter
and is still awaiting a reply. In fact the Claimant had been in constant contact
by telephone with the Office of the Governor concerning the result of the
interview for the post of Inspector of Police.
 On return to Montserrat in August the Claimant said that he went to the
Office of PSHRM (1 suppose that is the Permanent Secretary Human
Resource Management), he had a conversation with Mrs. Daphne Cassell
who told the Claimant of a letter she sent to the Commissioner of Police.
Mrs. Cassell eventually gave the Claimant a copy of the same letter.
 The letter is in the following terms:-
Mr. Julian Wade
43 Hockley Close
Birmingham B 19 2NS
UFS Commissioner of Police,
Dear Mr. Wade,
REOUEST FOR INFORMATION
With reference to your letter dated the 4th May 2009, to His Excellency the Governor on
the above subject, seeking information as to the notification of the outcome of the
selection process for the post of Inspector in the Royal Montserrat Police Force, we
advise that you were not offered the post of Inspector in the Royal Montserrat Police
Force (my emphasis). Kindly accept our apologies for the delay in responding.
Daphne Cassell (Mrs.)
Permanent Secretary (HRM)
Cc His Excellency the Governor.
 After receipt of the above letter the Claimant on the 10th November 2009
wrote to the Office of the PSHRM requesting information concerning the
refusal to appoint him to the rank of Inspector. On the 2nd December 2009
Mrs. Ryan ofPSHRM responded in the following terms:-
Dear Mr. Wade,
Your request of 28th October, 2009 refers:
” Please be advised as follows in relation to your application and interview for the post
ofInspector in the Royal Montserrat Police Force:
1. In July 2008 the Public Service Commission recommended your appointment
as Inspector of Police which was approved by the Governor.
2. On the 21 st August 2008 you were severely reprimanded by the Commissioner
of Police for your actions in an incident made the subject of a complaint against
the Force made by Mr. Alwyn Ponteen. The complaint was found to be justified
and the Force suffered embarrassment and was required to pay monetary
compensation to Mr. Ponteen. As a result of that disciplinary mark against you
and on the basis that you were scheduled to remain overseas completing studies,
the Governor’s approval for your appointment was rescinded on the basis that
it would not be in the best interest of the Force or Public for you to be
3. As a result, you were not offered the position of Inspector of Police. The said
post was re-advertised and filled. Please be guided accordingly.
 As a result of the foregoing, the Claimant has brought this motion alleging
inter alia that the Governor breached the rules of Natural Justice when he
failed to give him an opportunity to be heard before deceiving to rescind his
appointment as Inspector of Police.
” Judicial Review is available in cases where a decision making body (or
authority) exceeds its powers, commits an error of law, commits a
breach of Natural Justice, reached a decision which no reasonable
Tribunal could have reached or abuses its powers. ” (per Small Davis
 The crucial issue to be determined in my opinion is, was the Claimant
appointed as an Inspector of Police of the Royal Montserrat Police Service.
Before I analyze this all important question, I shall first of all consider the
issue of Natural Justice.
 In Lambert Nelson v The Mayor and citizens of Castires2
Harriprashad- Charles J. quoting from the decision of Tucker C.J in Rusell v
Duke of Norforlk.3 Lord Tucker opined:
” There was in my view, no words of which are of universal application to
every kind of enquiry and every kind of domestic tribunal. The requirements
of Natural Justice must depend on the circumstances of every case, the
nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the
subject matter that is being dealt with and so forth Accordingly, I do not
derive much assistance from the definitions of Natural Justice which have
been from time to time used, but, whatever standard is adopted, one essential
is that the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of
presenting his case.” (my emphasis)
 In Ridge v Baldwin and others 4 Lord Eversthed at page 84 said: –
‘Jared Adams v Commissioner of Police of the Royal Angui llan Police Force and Hon AG 89 of2009 H.C
2 SLHCY/2004/0035 at para 24
3 (1949) I AEL 109, 118
” It has been said many times that the exact requirements in any case of the
so called principles of Natural Justice cannot be precisely defined; that they
depend in each case on the circumstances of that case. According to Sir
Frederick Pollock the meaning of the phrase “natural justice” is the “ultimate
principle of fitness with regard to the nature of man as rational as a rational
and social being.”
 Learned counsel for the Claimant in his written submission refers to
Section 11(2) of the Police Act5 which provides:- “Every appointment to the
Force of the rank of Assistant Superintendant or Inspector shall be made by
the Governor after consultation with the Public Service Commission.”
 I make the observation that we are not here considering an appointment of
an Inspector. Mr. Brandt contends that in July 2008 Steve Forester, the
Commissioner of Police received a memorandum from the Permanent
Secretary, Human Resource informing him that the 1st Defendant has given
approval for the Claimant to be appointed Inspector. The said letter contained
an offer by the 1st Defendant to be signed by the Claimant. Mr. Steve Foster,
Commissioner of Police, refused to pass over the said documents to the
Claimant and instead returned them to the Permanent Secretary, Department
 In this regard the Claimant said under cross-examination-
” I did not receive a letter in respect of the promotion. I was not given any
assurance by anyone that I would be made an inspector. I was made an
4 (1963) 2 ALLER 66
, Chapter 10.01 of the Laws of Montserrat
Inspector. I am clear what an offer is”, I am clear what an acceptance is- a
willingness to be bound by an offer. I would not agree with you that there
was no contract. The offer letter was not given to me by the Commissioner so
that I could not have accepted,”
 Mr. Brandt argues that he, the Governor, subsequently consulted the
Commissioner of Police and withdrew the offer without consulting the Public
Service Commission as required by law, Mr. Brandt failed to indicate what
law he was referring to which mandates the Governor to consult with the
Commission before withdrawal of the offer. I know of no such law,
 Mr. Brandt submits:-
“”, that the first Defendant had a duty to consult the Public Service
Commission not only when the Claimant applied to become an inspector of
Police but also after the Commissioner of Police made an adverse report on
the Claimant. He ought to have consulted with the Public Service
Commission on receipts of this new information,”
 In support of that submission, learned counsel referred to the Public
Service Commission Act 6
 S4(1) provides:-
“Power to make appointments to Public office” , IS hereby vested 111 the
Governor after consultation with the Commission,”
 I would simply say that the Governor was not making an appointment to a
6 Chapter 0 J ,6 Laws of Montserrat
 Learned Counsel, Mr. Brandt, argues that the duty to consult under
Section 4( I) is mandatory for the purposes of the legislation in that of the I $I
Defendant made an appointment in breach of the provision for consultation,
that any appointment so made is invalid Bradbury v London Borough of
 Again, I reiterate this is for an appointment. Is learned counsel, on behalf
of the Claimant saying that the Governor failed to consult the Commission
and therefore the “appointment” of the Claimant to the post of Inspector of
Police is invalid?
 Mr. Brandt also contends that the procedure before the Commission is that
the Claimant had to be accorded the right to put his case and cross-examine
Mr. Ponteen and the other witnesses who gave evidence against him. He had
no such opportunity before the I $I Defendant. The matter so far as the
withdrawal of the offer of appointment to the post of Inspector was never
before the Commission.
 Mr. Brandt argues that” the Claimant was required by Law to have a fair
hearing before the offer of promotion was recalled.
 Learned counsel refers to a dictum by Lord Bridge in Lloyd v McMahon8
I shall quote the whole passage to get a full meaning of what was said as
learned counsel quoted only part.
“My Lords the so called rules of Natural Justice are not engraved on tablets
of stone. To use the phrase which better expresses the underlying concept,
7  3 A.L. L. ER 424
•  Act 25 at 702-703
what the requirements of fairness demands when any body, domestic,
administrative or judicial has to make a decision which will affect the rights
of individuals depends on the character of the decision making body, the
kind of decision it has to make and the statutory or other frame work in
which it operates. In particular, it is well established that when a statute has
conferred on anybody the power to make a decision affecting individuals,
procedure prescribed by statute to be followed, but will readily imply so
much and no more to be introduced by way of additional procedural
safeguards as will ensure attainment of fairness.” (my emphasis)
 I know of no statutory provision which governs the withdrawal of an offer.
In this case the withdrawal of an offer to be promoted to the rank of Inspector
of Police. Mr. Brandt has pointed me to none.
 I must not be taken for one minute, as saying that the decision maker in
exercising the power must not act fairly.
 In my view the underlined words, particularly the kind of decision it has
to make, are critically important in the light of the facts of this case.
 Learned Counsel for the Claimant argues that the Claimant contends that
he had a legitimate expectation that he would have been given an opportunity
by the 151 Defendant to be heard.
 Mr. Brandt contends that the basic right to be heard is a fundamental
aspect of procedural fairness. This often involves putting matters to a
particular person and allowing them the chance to comment. He refers to:- F
Hoffman La Roche and co AG. and others v Secretary of State for Trade
and Industry. 9 Lord Diplock at 368 said:
” .. it is the duty of the Commissioner to observe the rules of Natural Justice
in the course of their investigation- which means no more than they must act
fairly by giving to the person whose activities are being investigated a
reasonable opportunity to put forward facts and arguments in justification of
his conduct of these activities before they reach a conclusion which may
affect him adversely”‘
 Mr. Brandt referred to:- General Medical Council v Spackman10 Lord
Wright at page 644 opined:-
” If the principles of Natural Justice are violated in respect of any decision it
is indeed, immaterial, whether the same decision would have been arrived at
in the absence of the departure from the principles of Justice. The decision
must be declared to be no decision.: –
 Finally Mr. Brandt in his Skeleton Submissions argue that Mr. Wade’s
case is not based on Contract but inter alia on legitimate expectations. It does
not depend upon offer and acceptance. Once he was recommended by the
Public Service Commission from among 11 persons and his appointment was
approved by the Governor, he had a legitimate expectation that he would be
appointed. It did not depend upon communicating to him.
 The simple point I make is, if the offer was not communicated to him, how
would he operate in the post ofInspector?
, [I975] AC 295
10  AC. 627
In Regina v The Department of Education and Employment II Peter
Gibson L.J at paragraph 48 referred to De Smith, Woolf and Jowell in
Judicial Review of Administrative Action l2 The learned authors inform us:
” Although detrimental reliance should not therefore be a condition precedent
to protection of a substantive legitimate expectation, it may be relevant in
two situations: first, it might provide evidence of the existence or extent of an
expectation. In that sense it can be a consideration to be taken into accowlt in
deciding whether a person was in fact led to believe that the authority would
be bound by the representations. Second, detrimental reliance may be
relevant to the decision of authority whether to revoke a representation.”
 At paragraph 50 of R v Department of Education (supra) Peter Gibron
L.J referring to R v North & East Devon Health Authority, exp
Coughlan13 in which Lord WoolfM.R said:
“When the court considers that a lawful promise or practice has induced a
legitimate expectation of a benefit which is substantial, not simply
procedural, authority now establishes that here too the court within a proper
case decided whether to frustrate a new and different course will amount to
an abuse of power. Here, once the legitimacy of the expectation is
established, the court will have the task of weighing the requirements of
fairness against any overriding interest relied upon for the change of policy.”
” QBC OF 1999/0782/4 Civil Division
12 5″‘ Edition 1955 P 524
13 16 unreported 16 July 1999
 In light of the foregoing, in my opinion, it seems to me that Mr. Brandt’s
submission was based on a procedural benefit and not one which is
 I know of no promise direct or indirect, or can be inferred which would
avail the Claimant so that he can rely on legitimate expectation. However as 1
said above the decision maker, in this case, the Governor, must act fairly.
“Legitimate expectation sought to be relied on as a basis of Judicial review
must emanate from an unequivocal and unambiguous representation
expressed or implied of a public authority … ” See Attorney General and
others vs. Joyce and Boylel4
 Even if the Claimant could rely on legitimate expectation the court must
first of all conduct a balancing exercise. In Nersham Insurance (Barbados)
Limited v The supervisor ofInsurance et al. 15 Chase J. opined:
” … depending on the circumstance, fairness is not limited to the person who
alleges unfairness in the decision making process but where the public
interest is affected, fairness extends to the community at large. To my mind,
fairness may also include the existence of a just system to ensure that the
ends of Justice are met.”
DID THE GOVERNOR ACT FAIRLY
 Learned Counsel Mr. Brandt in his Skeleton arguments filed on 7”’
October and which I received on 31 st October argues that the Claimant was
treated unfairly. He had a right to be heard by the Governor, Mr. Bacon and
14 69 WIR 104 TO 107
IS Suil no. 26511996 I” July 1996 H.C Barbados
Mr. Foster. He was not accorded due process. After Mr. Foster “bad talked”
the Claimant, it was incumbent upon the Governor to put what Mr. Foster
said to the Claimant and get his side of the story. After affording him the
opportunity he could have decided not to approve the Claimant’s promotion
but he must be given the opportunity to be heard.
 According to Mr. Brandt it is a matter of adjectival law not of substantive
law. The questions “Was the decision reached fairly” and “Was the decision
a fair one” remains separate questions. The test is not ” has an unjust
decision been reached?” but the principle of fairness is rooted in the common
law and fairness involves a right to be heard “was there an opportunity
afforded for injustice to be done?”. Mr. Brandt refers to “Barrs Supra” (The
case was neither provided nor the citation).
 The first observation I wish to make is that Mr. Foster was not bad talking
(as Mr. Brandt inelegantly puts it) the Claimant. Mr. Foster, as
Commissioner, has a duty to report to the Governor the result of the
 The letter from the Department of Administration dated the 2nd December
2009 giving the reason for rescinding the approval for the appointment of the
Claimant to the rank of Inspector reads in part as follows:
” … on August 21 51 2008 you were severely reprimanded by the
Commissioner of Police for your actions in an incident made the subject of a
complaint against the Force made by Mr. Alwyn Ponteen. The complaint was
found to be justified and the Force suffered embarrassment and was
required to pay monetary compensation to Mr. Ponteen .. . the
Governor’s approval for your appointment was rescinded on the basis that it
would not be in the best interest of the Force or the public for you to be
appointed (my emphasis) .. ”
In rescinding the decision to appoint the Claimant the Governor took into
consideration not only the interest ofthe police force but also the interest of
 I am of the view that the Governor in acting fairly should not only take
into consideration the interest of the Claimant but, that of the public,
CRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
 On Saturday 7th July 2007 the Claimant arrested Alwyn Ponteen. This
arrest triggered the inquiry into the Claimant’s conduct. On 18th March 2008,
some nine months after the arrest, the Claimant was interviewed for the post
of Inspector of Police. When the Claimant was interviewed the investigation
 Mr. Foster in cross-examination said:-
” It was a three personal panel that did the interview I brought it to the
attention of the panel that there were two ongoing investigations against Mr.
Wade.” Mr. Foster al so said that he was a member of the three member panel
that interviewed the claimant.
 It was suggested to Mr. Foster in cross-examination that he should not
have allowed the Claimant to be interviewed because of the ongoing
investigation. Had he done so, the Commissioner would have been accused
of bias on prejudging the issue.
 Mr. Foster said in cross-examination that he reported the incident to the
Governor in 2007 as he was duty bound to do. He also said that the Ponteen
matter was not finalized until 2008.
 In July 2008 the Public Service recommended the Claimant’s appointment
as an Inspector. Which was approved by the Governor.
 According to the letter from the Department of Administration (referred to
above) the Commissioner reprimanded the Claimant on the 21 st August, the
report into the incident involving the arrest of Mr. Ponteen must have been
released on 21 sl August or close to that date. The Claimant left for studies in
England on the following day nnd August 2008.
 The Commissioner of Police informed the Governor of the result of the
investigation, that was after the Governor had approved the recommendation
of the Public Service recommendation that the Claimant should be appointed
to the post of Inspector of Police. The Governor then rescinded his approval.
 I turn now to consider the case of Ridge v Baldwin and others 16. Ridge
the Applicant was Chief Constable of Brighton Borough Police Force He,
along with 2 other junior officers was arrested for criminal conspiracy to
corrupt the course of justice. He was suspended from duty after he had been
arrested. Two indictments were filed against the Appellant and his co
accused- Criminal conspiracy and corruption. At the end of his trial on the
first indictment the appellant was acquitted but the other two officers were
16  AEN 66
convicted. In passmg sentence on the two convicted officers, the judge
commented that they had not had from the appellant the professional and
moral leadership which they should have had.
 At the trial on the Second indictment on 6th March 1958, the prosecution
offered no evidence against the appellant. The judge directed the jury to
acquit him. Again, the judge made observations about the appellant. On 7’h
March 1958, the Watch Committee held a meeting which, after considering
matters relating to the appellant, they unanimously di smissed him from his
office as Chief Constable.
 The appellant commenced an action against the Watch committee
claiming that his purported di smissal was void and also claiming payment of
salary and pension or alternatively damages. His action was dismissed. On
appeal, The House of Lords, by a majority. Held, (Lord Evershead
dissenting) The deci sion of the Watch Committee on 7th March 1958
dismissing the appellant was null and void for the following reasons:- (I refer
to the reason so far that is material to the case under consideration.) (Lord
Devlin dissenting) the consequence of a failure to observe the rules of
Natural Justice was that the decision of 7th was void not merely voidable.
 Lord Evershead in a powerful dissention judgment. I accept it is a
dissenting judgment and what this means.
 Lord Evershead in considering the words of Donavan J, the learned trial
judge at the appellant’s trial when he told the two officers who were tried
with the appellant that “they had not had from the appellant the professional
and moral leadership which they should have had.”
 Lord Evershead at page 18 of the judgment opined:-
” As I understand the language of Donovan J ( and as I no doubt , the Watch
committee also understood it) The appellant had been shown not to possess a
sense of responsibility sufficient for the office which he held and so was
unable to provide to the police force under his control which his office
 The first of the relevant headings in the discipline code, “Discredible
conduct” is thus defined: “that is to say, if a member of the Police Force acts
in a disorderly manner or any manner prejudicial to the discipline or
reasonably likely to bring discredit on the reputation of the force or of the
 It must be remembered that the Watch Committee was acting on the
criticism of the behavior of the appellant by the judge. The decision as the
failure of the Watch Committee to observe the rules of Natural Justice the
decision being void, two of judges of the House of Lords dissented.
 In the case at bar a report was made by Ponteen. The Claimant was told of
the report. He wrote a detailed 5 page report in answer to the Complaint. In
this regard it cannot be seriously contended, in my considered opinion, that
he was not given an opportunity to be heard or to respond to the allegation
which was made against him.
 The internal investigation which was conducted in relation to the Ponteen
affair, the report was before the investigator(s), who ever carried out the
investigation. I reiterate it cannot be said that he was not heard. One does not
have to be present to be heard.
 Having carried out the investigation and I entertain no doubt that it was
properly carried out in light of the fact that the Claimant’s report was before
the investigator(s). In that regard he was heard. The report which resulted
from the investigation was eventually passed to the Governor who revoked
his approval for the Claimant to be elevated to the rank of Inspector of
Police. One of the reasons given for the revocation was that it would not be
in the interest of the public or police force.
 Learned Counsel Mr. Meade who apparently had conduct of this matter on
behalf of the Defendants, in his Skeleton arguments submits that the
Defendants did not breach the the rules of Natural Justice by not affording
the Claimant an opportunity to be heard after the Public Service Commission
made its recommendations. His Excellency the Governor recommending the
appointment of the Claimant, disciplinary breaches came to light. They were
the subject of an internal investigation in which the Claimant made written
statements outlining his actions in respect of the two incidents, one involving
a firearm incidents, the other involving unlawful arrest and false
imprisonment in respect of Alwyn Ponteen. He was cleared of the firearm
incident. The incident involving Alwyn Ponteen amounted to unlawful arrest
and gross misconduct.
 As a result a formal apology was offered to Mr. Ponteen on behalf of the
Montserrat Police Force and compensation was paid to Mr. Ponteen by the
Montserrat Police Force.
 The Claimant was given a formal reprimand. His Excellency the Governor
acting upon the result of the internal investigation decided to rescind his
approval for the appointment of the Claimant to the post of Inspector.
 Mr. Meade, Learned Counsel, argues that in that circumstance the rules of
Natural Justice were not breached. I agree.
 I turn now to the important question, was the Claimant appointed
Inspector of Police of the Montserrat Police Force. The answer in my
judgment, without a doubt, is no.
 Mr. Buffong learned counsel for the defendants in cross-examination of
the Claimant who said:- ” I did not receive a letter in respect of the
promotion … I was not given any assurance by anyone that I would be made
an Inspector. The application was not given to me by the Commissioner so
therefore I could not have accepted.”
 I am of the view that the basic elements of a contract have not been met.
 The Governor signed the approval for the Claimant to be elevated to the
rank of Inspector of Police. This was never communicated to him. He should
have signed a an acceptance form. He never received it or signed it. (See
Steve Foster’s Affidavit.) Moreover when one is promoted as Inspector of
Police that position must be gazetted. There is no indication that this was
done in relation to the Claimant. Clear indication, in my view that the
Claimant was never appointed or promoted to the rank of Inspector of Police
in the Montserrat Police Force.
[SO] There was no breach of the rules of Natural Justice with regard to the
rescind ing of the offer of appointment to the Claimant.
[SI] In light of the foregoing the remedies prayed for by the Claimant are
[S2] There will be no order as to costs .
………… dti.~~ …
High Court Judge