THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN SUPREME COURT
SAINT CHRISTOPHER AND NEVIS
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
CLAIM NO. SKBHCV2013/0069
DENISE VIOLET STEVENS
LUXURY HOTELS INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT
ST. KITTS LIMITED (formerly MARRIOTT ST.
Master Fidela Corbin-Lincoln
On Written Submissions:
Mr. Terence Byron and Ms. Talibah Byron for the Claimant
Ms. Elizabeth Harper and Mr. Jomokie Phillips for the Defendant
2014: December 19th
Application to amend the statement of case during assessment of damages hearing and
after the end of the relevant limitation period – Amendment to quantum of special damages
under the heads of special damages already pleaded- Whether amendment amounts to a
new claim- Whether amendment at this stage of the proceedings would result in prejudice
which cannot be remedied by an award of costs – Rules 1.2, 20.1 (3) and 20.2 (2) of the
Civil Procedure Rules 2000.
The claimant commenced a claim against the defendant for loss and damages arising from
the alleged negligence of the defendant. The defendant admitted liability and directions
were given for the assessment of damages hearing. On the day before the hearing was
scheduled for continuation the claimant made an application to amend the statement of
claim, specifically, the particulars of special damages by deleting some heads claimed and
adjusting the quantum claimed under others. At the time the application was filed the
limitation period for commencing a claim for negligence had expired.
HELD: Granting the application to amend the statement of claim and awarding costs of
$2,500.00 to the defendant the said costs to be set off against any claim for damages and
costs that may succeed.
1. The proposed amendments do not amount to a new claim under CPR 20.2 (2) or
fall within any of the other circumstances set out in CPR 20.2 which applies to
amendments to a statement of case after the end of the relevant limitation period.
In the circumstance the application fell to be decided under CPR 20.1 (3).
2. The promptness of an application is only one of the factors to which the court
should have regard when considering an application to amend a statement of
case. The overriding objective is that the court should deal with cases justly. That
includes, so far as practicable, ensuring that each case is dealt with not only
expeditiously but also fairly. Amendments in general ought to be allowed so that
the real dispute between the parties can be adjudicated upon provided that any
prejudice to the other party or parties caused by the amendments can be
compensated for in costs and the public interest in the efficient administration of
justice is not significantly harmed.
Cobbold v London Borough of Greenwich (unreported 9th August 1999) (CA)
National Westminster Bank v Rabobank Nederland  EWCA Civ 1578
Circumstances in Worldwide Corporation Limited v GPT Limited et al 
EWCA Civ 1894 distinguished.
 Corbin -Lincoln M [Ag]: This matter concerns an application by the claimant to
amend the statement of claim following judgment on admission of liability and
during the assessment of damages hearing.
 On 13th March 2013 the claimant commenced a claim against the defendant for
damages for personal injuries and consequential loss sustained on 20th March
2007 during the course of the claimant’s employment with the defendant.
 The claimant’s statement of claim pleads and particularises the claimant’s special
damages as follows:
Home help’s wages while incapacitated $ 5,000.00
Consultancy, Hospital and doctor’s fees $69,116.93
Medicine and drugs $10,086.00
Overseas travel, accommodation and food
for claimant and caretaker $12,000.00
Physiotherapy treatment $ 5,519.75
Telephone $ 500.00
Loss of wages from 20th March 2007 to March 2013 $52,353.60
Loss of future earnings $183,237.60
Diagnostic procedures $8,628.00
Medical reports $ 800.00
 On 15th April 2014, the learned Master granted judgment on admission of liability
against the defendant, gave directions for the assessment of damages hearing
and fixed the hearing for 2nd July 2014.
 The assessment of damages hearing commenced before the learned Master on
16th July 2014 and one (1) of the claimant’s three (3) witnesses gave evidence.
The matter was adjourned to 7th August 2014 for continuation.
 On 6th August 2014, the day before the hearing was scheduled for continuation,
the claimant filed an application to amend the statement of claim pursuant to the
Civil Procedure Rules (“CPR”) Part 20.2 (2) and the inherent jurisdiction of the
 The proposed amendments, which all relate to the claimant’s claim for special
damages, are as follows:
Home help’s wages while incapacitated $ 5000.00
Consultancy, Hospital and doctor’s fees $ 69,116.03
Medicine and drugs $ 10,086.00
Overseas travel, accommodation telephone use and
food for claimant and caretaker $ 12,000.00
Physiotherapy treatment $ 5,519.75
Telephone $ 500.00
Loss of wages from 20thMarch 2007 to 7th August 2014 $ 52,353.60
Loss of future earnings $183,237.60
Diagnostic procedures $8,628.00
Medical reports $ 800.00
 On 7th August 2014, Dr. Santana, one of the claimant’s medical experts who
resides out of the jurisdiction, attended the hearing to give evidence. Taking all the
circumstances into consideration, including that the defendant was not properly
served with the claimant’s application and that the parties were engaged in
settlement discussions, the learned Master took the evidence of Dr.
Santana and adjourned the matter for report.
 On 7th October 2014 the matter came up for report. The parties reported that the
matter was not settled. The parties were ordered to file affidavits and submissions
in relation to the claimant’s application to amend the statement of claim.
 The sole issue for determination is whether the court should permit an
amendment to the statement of claim.
CPR 20.2 (2) Changes to statements of case after end of relevant limitation
 The claimant’s claim is based on negligence. It is not disputed that the claimant’s
cause of action accrued on 20th March 2007 and that the period for commencing a
claim expired six years from that date1. The claimant is therefore seeking to
amend her statement of case after the expiration of the limitation period.
 CPR 20.2 applies to changes to a statement of case after the end of the relevant
limitation period. It states:
“ (2) The court may allow an amendment the effect of which will be to add or
substitute a new claim but only if the new claim arises out of the same or
substantially the same facts as a claim in respect of which the party wishing to
1Section 4 (1) (a) of the Limitation Act Cap 5.09 of the Laws of St. Christopher and Nevis.
change the statement of case has already claimed a remedy in the
(3) The court may allow an amendment to correct a mistake as to the name of
a party but only where the mistake was –
(a) genuine; and
(b) not one which would in all the circumstances cause
reasonable doubt as to the identity of the party in
(4)The court may allow an amendment to alter the capacity in which a
 The purpose of the claimant’s proposed amendment is neither to correct the
name of a party nor alter the capacity in which a party claims. It must however be
considered whether the proposed amendment amounts to the addition or
substitution of a new claim.
Do the proposed amendments amount to ‘a new claim’ ?
 CPR 2.4 states that ‘claim’ is to be construed in accordance with Part 8. CPR 8
does not however define the word ‘claim’ or ‘a new claim’.
 In England, the rule similar to CPR 20.2 (2) is CPR 17.4. CPR 17.4 states that
the rule applies where a person seeks to amend a statement of case and a period
of limitation has expired under, inter alia, the Limitation Act 1980. Section 35 (2)
of the Limitation Act 1980 defines ‘a new claim’ as a claim involving the addition
or substitution of a new cause of action.
 Section 4 (1) (a) of The Limitation Act Cap 5.09 of the Laws of St. Christopher
and Nevis establishes a limitation period of six (6) years for actions founded on tort
but does not define ‘a new claim’. Notwithstanding the absence of a definition, in
my view ‘a new claim’ in CPR 20.2 (2) means ‘a new cause of action”.
 In Cooke v Gill2 Brett J stated that:
“‘Cause of action’ has been held from the earliest time to mean every fact
which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed – every fact
which the defendant would have a right to traverse.”
 In Paragon Finance Plc v Thakerar & Co3 Millett LJ cited the definition of Brett
J and added:-
“… only those facts which are material to be proved are to be taken into
account. The pleading of unnecessary allegations or the addition of further
instances or better particulars do not amount to a distinct cause of action. The
selection must be made at the highest level of abstraction.”
 In Smith v Henniker-Major4 is was stated that :
“[I]n identifying a new cause of action the bare minimum of essential facts
abstracted from the original pleading is to be compared with the minimum
as it would be constituted under the amended pleading.”
 Looking at the claimant’s claim as a whole, the bare and essential facts of the tort
of negligence as alleged in the original statement of claim are that :
(a) The defendant owed the claimant a duty of care;
(b) The defendant breached that duty on 20th March 2007 in carrying out
its business of managing the Marriott Royal St. Kitts Beach resort; and
2(1873) LR 8CP107, 116
3 1 AER 400, 405
4 Ch. 182, 210 Robert Walker LJ
(c) As a result of that breach the claimant fell on the defendant’s
premises during the course of her employment and suffered personal
injuries, loss and damage.
 Those bare and essential facts also appear in the draft amended statement of
claim with some amendments to the particulars of special damage.
 Pleading additional facts or better particulars constituting a breach of a duty
already pleaded does not amount to a new cause of action.5 Longmore LJ in
Berezovsky v Abramovich6 stated:
“The addition or substitution of a new loss is by no means necessarily the
addition or substitution of a new cause of action. For a cause of action to
arise in tort there must be a breach of duty which causes loss but it is
permissible to add or substitute further losses if they all stem from an
original breach of duty which has caused some loss. This happens every
day in personal injury claims in which a loss of earnings claim may be
added to (or substituted for) a claim for loss and suffering, even after the
original time-bar has expired; there is no question of a new cause of
action being added or substituted because the loss all stems from the
negligent act of the car driver or other tortfeasor”
 In the present claim the bare and essential facts in the original statement of claim
are the same as those in the draft amended statement of claim. The
proposed amendments, in my view, expand on the original pleadings and do not
amount to the addition of a new claim.
 Since the proposed amendments do not amount to the addition or substitution of
new claim the application does not fall within the parameters of CPR 20.2. In the
5Darlington Building Society v O’Rourke James Scourfield 1998 All ER.
6 All ER (D) 253
circumstance, the application in my view fails to be determined under CPR 20.1
which deals with amendments to a statement of case generally and sets out the
factors to which the court must have regard.
CPR 20.1 – Changes to Statements of Case
 CPR Part 20.1 (3) states:
“(3) When considering an application to amend a statement of case pursuant
to Rule 20.1(2), the factors to which the court must have regard are –
(a) how promptly the applicant has applied to the court after becoming
aware that the change was one which he or she wished to make;
(b) the prejudice to the applicant if the application were refused;
(c) the prejudice to the other parties if the change were permitted;
(d) whether any prejudice to any other party can be compensated by
the payment of costs and or interest;
(e) whether the trial date or any likely trial date can still be met if the
application is granted; and
(f) the administration of justice.
 I pause to highlight that CPR 29.2 (1) states that the general rule is that any
fact which needs to be proved by evidence of witnesses is to be proved at trial by
oral evidence or by affidavit at any other hearing. For the purposes of the
application before the court, any fact upon which either party wishes to rely
should be in the affidavits filed by the parties rather than in submissions since the
latter does not constitute evidence.
The Promptness of the Application
 The claimant’s grounds in support of the application7 and her affidavit in support 8
state that she only became aware of the need for the amendment “after the end of
the limitation period”. The claimant states further that “I only realized that the
change was one which I was in a position to make since the defendant admitted
liability and correspondence was exchanged….within the last three months.”
 A party may amend his statement of case at any time after the date fixed for the
first case management with leave of the court. This is not dependent on or subject
to the other party admitting liability. The relationship between the claimant’s ability
to amend her statement of case and the admission of liability by the defendant is
therefore unclear to me.
 The test is not when the claimant ‘realized it was a change which she was in a
position to make’ but rather how soon the application was made after the claimant
became aware that the change is one she wanted to make. The claimant’s
evidence on this issue is vague and unclear. The claimant’s evidence is that she
became aware of the matters she now wishes to amend after the end of the
limitation period but there is no evidence of how soon after March 2013 (the
end of the limitation period) she became so aware .
 The claimant states that she has been “routinely informing the defendant of her
expenses, losses and damage suffered…all along the way and ever since she first
began incurring such expense” and that she disclosed the documentation to
which proposed amendments relate on 23rd December 2013.9 It can therefore
be inferred that the claimant knew that the particulars of special damages which
she now proposes to amend had changed at least by 23rd December 2013 – the
7 Paragraph 7 of the grounds
8 Paragraph 3 (a)
9 Paragraphs 8 (i) and (ii) of the grounds
date by which it is alleged that all documents related to the proposed
amendments were disclosed to the defendant.
 The application to amend the claim was made on 6thAugust 2014 – almost eight
(8) months after the claimant became aware or ought to have been aware that
there were changes to the particulars of her special damages which would need to
be amended. In my view eight (8) months is an inordinately long period to wait
to make an application to amend the particulars of special damages. I find that in
all the circumstances the application was not made promptly.
Prejudice to the Claimant
 The claimant states that if the application to amend the particulars of special
damages is refused she would suffer prejudice because:
(a) she is only seeking to be compensated for losses which she can prove she
has incurred 10 ;
(b) the defendant has admitted liability and by so doing has accepted that it is
responsible for compensating her for consequential loss and damage suffered;
(c) it would be an unduly harsh penalty to her and would represent a windfall to
the defendant if she was unable to amend the particulars of special damage.11
 In essence, the claimant asserts that if she is unable to amend the particulars of
special damages she will be unable to recover the loss actually suffered even
though she has documentary evidence to prove same and could do so at trial.
10 Paragraph 11 of the grounds
11 Paragraph 17 of the grounds
 I find that the claimant would suffer prejudice if she is unable to amend her
statement of claim to reflect the actual quantum of loss suffered as a result of
the defendant’s admitted negligence
Prejudice to the Defendant
 The claimant states that the defendant would not suffer any prejudice if the
amendments were allowed since:
(a) the claimant has been informing the defendant of her expenses along the
(b) the documentation to which proposed amendments relate were disclosed on
23rdDecember 2013 and supplemental disclosures were made in June 2014
and July 2014 after further proof of losses incurred came into her possession;
(c) Counsel for the defendant brought to the attention of counsel for the claimant
several of the inaccuracies and discrepancies to which the proposed
amendments relate; and
(d) The defendant, as the claimant’s employers, must have knowledge of what the
claimant’s loss of past wages were and would be taken by surprise by this.
 The defendant’s affidavit in opposition to the claimant’s application consists of ten
(10) paragraphs. Paragraphs 6 to 9 appear to address the issue of prejudice.
 Paragraph 6 of the affidavit in opposition states that an application “at this stage is
even more incongruous given that this is a personal injuries matter, and of which
special damages must be pleaded and proved. The entertainment of the
Application, would to say the least, impact significantly the evidence of which has
already been given.”
 There is nothing strange about the claimant’s application in my view. It appears to
me that the application has been made by the claimant in recognition of the well
established principle that special damages must pleaded, particularized and
 While the defendant asserts that granting the application at this stage would
significantly impact the evidence already given, no evidence has been provided
of precisely how permitting the amendment would impact this evidence. In the
absence of any evidence in this regard I am unable to ascertain how permitting the
amendment would significantly impact the evidence already given.
 Paragraph 7 of the affidavit in opposition states, “As at the date of filing of the
Application, the claimant has now had the benefit of representations of the
Defendant and the Court during the assessment of damages part-hearing and has
in view of same, belatedly and improperly sought to benefit there from with this illtimes
but tactical application for amendment.”
 It is not stated in the affidavit what representations were made by the defendant
and the court during the hearing and how the claimant is seeking to improperly
benefit from same. In the absence of any evidence on this issue I am unable to
ascertain how this amounts to prejudice to the defendant.
 Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the affidavit in opposition state:
“The prejudice that would befall the Defendant if the Application were
permitted would grossly outweigh that of the claimant and of which the
Defendant’s prejudice could not be compensated by way of costs to it.
As a result of this Application, the assessment of damages hearing is at a
standstill – notwithstanding that the hearing has already commenced, and
of which has been part heard by the Court on two occasions. The
Application itself, if granted, would have a significant effect on the
administration of justice in this case – the assessment of damages
hearing having already been part heard on two occasions, with all
evidence save the Claimant already attended to, it should not now be
open to the Claimant to take this position at this stage.”
 The assessment of damages hearing was scheduled for continuation on 7th
August 2014. At that stage the remaining witnesses were Dr. David Santana, the
expert who travelled from Trinidad and Tobago for the hearing, and the claimant.
After taking into consideration, among other things, the claimant’s filing of the
instant application the previous day and the fact that the parties were engaged in
settlement discussions, the court decided to proceed with the evidence of Dr.
Santana and adjourned the matter for report on a date to be fixed and notified by
the court unless a consent order was sooner filed.
 It cannot be disputed that but for the filing of the application by the claimant the
assessment of damages hearing could have proceeded on 7th August 2014. I am
unable to go further and say that the matter would have been concluded on that
date as that would have depended on several factors such as the length of the
time required for the evidence to be given and the court’s schedule. It is however
not completely accurate to say that the filing of the application by the claimant is
the sole cause of the assessment of damages hearing being at the standstill. A
major cause of the delay in a new date being fixed for the continuation of the
hearing is the fact that the matter is part heard before another Master. The parties
have been notified that efforts will be made by the court to fix a date in January
2015 for the continuation of the hearing by the Master before whom the hearing
 It is clear to me however that the claimant’s application has contributed to a delay
in the proceedings and that this delay can be said to be prejudicial to the
defendant in the sense that it defers a final determination of the matter. Save for
delay however, there is no evidence of prejudice to the defendant if the
application is granted.
Can any Prejudice be Compensated By the Payment of Costs and or
 The defendant has placed heavy reliance on the case of Worldwide Corporation
Limited v GPT Limited et al12 in support of the submission that the prejudice to
the defendant cannot be adequately compensated in damages. The facts of that
case are in my view distinguishable from the preset case. That case concerned an
appeal against three orders of the trial judge refusing to allow the defendant to
make further amendments to the statement of case during the trial of the matter
which was scheduled to last 24 days. The pleadings had been amended
previously and the proposed amendments involved: (a) what was almost a
wholesale abandonment of the previously pleaded case with the result that ‘a
more extensive and different investigation’ would be required if the pleadings were
amended; and (b) an essentially new claim with respect to the basis of the claim
for quantum meruit which would require the defendant to get time to obtain
additional evidence. Based on the facts of that case the Court of Appeal upheld
the decision of the judge to refuse leave to amend.
 In this case, the proposed amendments cannot be described as a wholesale
abandonment of the basis of the claimant’s case which would require a different
investigation. The claim is still founded in the tort of negligence and the nature of
the investigation required remains the same – the claimant must prove her
 I note that the case of Worldwide Corporation Limited v GPT Limited et al was
decided prior to the introduction of the UK CPR.
 I am cognizant of the fact that the UK CPR 17.1 (2), the rule similar to our CPR
20.1, does not contain provisions similar to our CPR 20.1 (2) which sets out the
matters to which the court should have regard when considering an application
12 EWCA Civ 1894
to amend a statement of case and therefore applications to amend a statement of
case in the UK are governed by the overriding objective.
 Notwithstanding, I am of the view that the UK cases decided after the introduction
of the CPR, provide useful guidance and are persuasive authority particularly
given the fact that CPR 1.2 requires the court to give effect to the overriding
objective of dealing with cases justly when exercising any discretion given to it by
 In Cobbold v London Borough of Greenwich13, decided after the introduction of
the CPR, the UK Court of Appeal was considering the trial judge’s refusal of an
application to amend the defence. Peter Gibson LJ stated:
“It is, of course, important that trial dates, when they are fixed, should be
adhered to, but I fear that [the first instance judge in that case] may have
let that factor dictate his approach to the question of amendment. The
overriding objective is that the court should deal with cases justly. That
includes, so far as practicable, ensuring that each case is dealt with not
only expeditiously but also fairly. Amendments in general ought to be
allowed so that the real dispute between the parties can be adjudicated
upon provided that any prejudice to the other party or parties caused by
the amendments can be compensated for in costs, and the public interest
in the efficient administration of justice is not significantly harmed . . . .
There is always prejudice when a party is not allowed to put forward his
real case, provided that that is properly arguable.”
 In setting aside the order refusing leave to amend, the Court of Appeal took into
consideration, among other things, that the claimant was aware for several
months of the point which the defendant wished to take and although the
defendant ought to have sought leave to make the amendment earlier it could
13(unreported 9 August 1999) (CA) cited with approval in National Westminster Bank v Rabobank
Nederland  EWCA Civ 1578
not be said that the claimant was taken by surprise. In Cobbold the amendment
involved what was in essence a new case and notwithstanding same the
amendment was allowed. In this case the proposed amendments do not amount to
a new claim.
 In Chilton v Surrey Court Council14 the court was considering an appeal against
the trial judge’s decision to refuse leave to amendment the schedule of special
damages shortly before trial. The document ought to have been filed at the latest
at the pre-trial review. The trial judge stated that the amendment was effectively,
raising a $5,000 claim to a $400,000 claim and the existence of such a claim had
not been foreshadowed. Henry LJ, delivering the judgment of the court, stated:
“When one looks at the documents it seems to me that the presence of a
substantial claim for loss of earnings was clearly foreshadowed on those
documents. The initial pleadings in the case pleaded the medical report
into the prognosis that this was a second break of the left femur. Under
“Prognosis” the document said:
He is now severely disabled and unlikely ever to walk without a
stick or crutch. The lower left third of the left femur will always be
vulnerable and it is likely that he will always have to wear some
sort of splint. His functional disability has been significantly
reduced by the accident on 3 February 1995. He is likely to
develop osteoarthritis five to ten years earlier than he would have
done but for the accident….”
The medical report made clear that that was five years from the accident.
The medical report was served with the particulars of claim. It showed
that this was a relatively serious injury. I quote from para 36:
14  CPLR 525
“The effect of the second fracture was to convert a moderately
severe disability into a total disability, both because of the delicate
nature of the bone union of the second fracture, and because of
the residual stiffness of the left knee. At present he is severely
disabled…The second fracture is likely to increase the rate of
development of osteoarthritis and I estimate that he is now likely
to develop significant symptoms from the left knee from the age of
forty-five onwards as a result of the fracture of 1995.”
It is clear that injuries like that potentially lead to a loss of earnings claim. “
 After considering the exchange of correspondence between the parties the
learned LJ continued:
“We do not know what happened as a result of that exchange but it was
clear that the defendants there contemplated that they would be faced
with a loss of earnings claim.”
 With respect to the claimant’s evidence of prejudice the Henry LJ noted:
“In relation to the prejudice suffered by the defendants, on the affidavit before
the judge it was simply generally asserted that matters were dealt with on the
basis of a modest claim when they would have been dealt with differently if
there had been a more substantial claim. In relation to the question of
quantum that is probably right but it can be remedied by giving the defendants
the opportunity to do that work. That can simply be done. The claim on
quantum would not be able to be heard next week in any event.”
 In the present claim the claimant’s statement of claim contains particulars of
special damages which set out the specific heads of losses being sought by the
claimant. While changing the quantum being claimed, the proposed amendments
do not add any new heads and therefore it cannot be argued that the defendant is
caught by surprise by the various heads of special damages being claimed.
 Unlike the claimant in Chilton v Surrey Court Council the defendant has led no
evidence that it would be required to deal with the case differently and, if so, how
if the amendments are allowed and the quantum claimed under various heads of
special damages varied. In the absence of any evidence in this regard it is not
necessary to consider whether any prejudice could have been remedied by an
award of costs or in some other way.
 Having considered the evidence provided by the defendant with respect to
prejudice which will be caused if the application is granted, I find that the only
evidence of prejudice to the defendant is delay caused by the filing of the
application. In my view this prejudice can be compensated by an award of costs
and by the court taking this consideration in determining interest to be awarded on
Can the Trial Date or Any likely Trial Date still Be Met If the Application is
 A date for the continuation of the hearing has not been fixed by the court but the
likely date will be in or around January 2015. There is no evidence by the
defendant that the granting of the application would result in the defendant having
to take any further steps prior to the continuation of the hearing and that such
steps would require significant time to be completed so as to affect the likely trial
date. I therefore find that the likely trial date in January 2015 would not be affected
if the application is granted.
The Administration of Justice
 The overriding objective is to deal with cases justly. A refusal of the application
would in my view prevent the claimant from seeking to recover losses suffered as
a result of the negligence of the defendant. Permitting the amendment will not
automatically result in the claimant recovering the sums pleaded – she is still
required to prove her loss at the hearing in which the defendant has an opportunity
to be heard. The only evident prejudice to the defendant in my view can be
compensated in costs and or in the determination of an award of interest and in
the circumstances I do not find that the amendment would result in an injustice
to the defendant.
 Taking all the circumstances into consideration, notwithstanding the delay by the
claimant in making the application, I find the justice of the case requires that the
claimant be granted leave to amend her statement of case as indicated in the draft
amended statement of claim.
 I therefore order as follows:
1. The claimant’s application to amend the statement of claim is granted.
2. The claimant shall file and serve an amended statement of claim within five (5)
3. The claimant shall pay costs of $2500.00 to the defendant. The costs shall be
set off against any claim for damages and costs that may succeed.
Fidela Corbin – Lincoln